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Abstract
Price and promotion strategy have been widely discussed in multichannel retailing, but little study was focused on the promotion strategy in the context of multiple platforms. Through transaction data from a company’s different platforms, our study investigated the
impact of promotion integration strategy on company’s
overall sales performance on different platforms. Combined with platform’s index data about product market
demand, the moderating effect of platform’s market demand was further evaluated. Using a fixed-effect model,
our research found the positive effect of promotion timing integration and the negative effect of promotion
depth integration on sales performance. We also found
the moderating effect of platform’s market demand.
Thus, our study generates important theoretical and
practical implications for managing promotion activity
on multiple platforms.

1.

Introduction

Nowadays, in order to get higher online market share,
more and more companies sell products through more
than one platform. On these multiple platforms, companies always do a lot of promotion activity by using the
platform’s various functions. Researchers suggested
that there exists both synergy and cannibalization effect
among multiple platforms [8, 11]. Thus, it is crucial for
companies to manage multiple platforms’ promotion activity. Existing studies have discussed about the price
and promotion strategy in multichannel retailing. Most
of them suggested for the promotion integration strategy,
which is defined as providing consistent price discount
in the various channels simultaneously [16]. But some
scholars have opposite opinion, such as [4] and [13].
That research has made contribution about promotion
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management in multichannel retailing. However, different channels have varied cost structural [23], which
leads to the difference among each channel’s promotion
decision. But in the context of multiple platforms, such
differentiation would be smaller. Moreover, customers
can search and compare product and price information
with lower costs in the context of multiple platforms
than in multichannel retailing. Thus, due to the lower
information asymmetry, the conclusion from multichannel retailing may not be suitable in the context of multiple platforms. Therefore, this study aims to investigate
how to manage multiple platforms’ promotion activity.
Marketing researchers revealed that promotion decision involves two aspects, which includes promotion
depth and promotion frequency [9]. For retailers who
enter multiple platforms, they must decide the extent of
promotion depth integration and promotion timing integration. The former refers to the similarity of different
platforms’ discount rates for the same product, while the .
latter stands for whether retailers implement the promotion activity simultaneously in the different platforms.
Hence, this study echoes the call of scholars [14] to investigate whether the promotion integration strategy
(i.e., promotion depth integration and promotion timing
integration) would influence company’s overall sales
performance on multiple platforms.
Moreover, existing literature suggested that the market environment would influence the effectiveness of
company’s business strategy [25]. Researchers have
demonstrated that some contingency factors would
moderate the effect of integration strategy, such as firm
characteristic, consumer characteristic and product
characteristic [5, 6, 7, 10, 16]. However, those studies
ignored the platform’s influence. Cross-side network effect have been emphasized on online platform, which
refers to the effect that users on each side of the market
benefit from the number of users on the other side and
that demand is the driving force for user participation
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[12, 18]. Hence, in the condition of high product market
demand, there would exist more competing sellers on
the platform, which further influence focal company’s
strategy effectiveness. However, there is limited study
examining how platform’s market demand influence the
effectiveness of company’s integration strategy [21].
Therefore, this study aims to bridge this gap by examining whether the platform’s market demand relieve or
magnify the impact of focal company’s promotion integration strategy.
With the transaction data from a Chinese company
who has stores on two online platforms, the current
study investigated the impact of promotion depth integration and promotion timing integration on sales performance. Further, combined with the platform’s product market demand index data, we evaluated how platform’s market demand moderate the effect of promotion
integration strategy. Our research employed a SKU
(stock keeping unit) level fixed-effect model to generate
several important findings. First, promotion timing integration can positively enhance sales performance. Second, promotion depth integration would negatively influence sales performance. Third, the enhancing effect
of promotion timing integration on sales performance
was weakened by higher platform’s market demand.
Thus, this study contributes to the extant literature in
the following ways. First, although the price and promotion strategy in multichannel retailing has been widely
discussed, researchers did not focus on the context of
multiple platforms. Second, we investigated the moderating role of platform’s market demand on the influence
of promotion integration strategy, which can contribute
to our understanding of why the platform’s market environment should be considered when making firm
strategy. Finally, our study provides practitioners with
valuable insights about how to manage the promotion
activity on multiple platforms.
We first review the related literature and then present
the hypotheses. Then based on our analysis and findings,
we would explain the results and propose several future
research directions.

2.

Literature review

The price and promotion management in multichannel retailing has received much attention by scholars
[14]. Most researchers support for the channel integration strategy [2, 15, 19], which is defined as providing
consistent information and integrated functions for customers in different channels [10]. For example, [15]
demonstrated that providing consistent product and
price information in varied channels can improve the information quality and customer’s perceived value.
Moreover, other scholars have diverse opinions about
multichannel promotion management. For example, [23]

suggested that it is possible for multichannel retailers to
charge different price for customers in varied channels.
Moreover, [4] pointed out that when the promotion is
differed in terms of price discount and frequency, it
would lead to the higher total sales. Nevertheless, [13]
did not find significant effect of the consistent price on
customer’s channel choice.
That research has made contribution to the multichannel promotion management, but the focus is on the
relationship of online, offline and other channels, such
as catalog. Researchers suggested that different cost
structural in varied channels would lead to the obvious
differences among each channel’s maximum promotion
depth [23]. However, among multiple platforms, the difference about maximum promotion depth in varied platforms would be smaller. Moreover, in the context of
multiple platforms, customers can easily get product information from various platforms. But such comparison
and switching behavior incurs high cost in multichannel
retailing. Hence, the information asymmetry is lower in
the context of multiple platforms and the results of multichannel retailing may not be applicable.
In addition, firm’s strategy may not always be effective in each situation [25]. Researchers also pinpointed
out that it is important to investigate the contextual factors that influence the effectiveness of integration strategy [21]. Although some studies have found the effect
of firm’s characteristic, such as firm’s experience in
online and offline channels [5], human resource capability [16], consumer’s characteristic, such as shopping
experience [7, 10] and product type [6], little study has
investigated the platform’s influence. Existing researchers have revealed the cross-side network effect on platform [18], which reflects that users on one side would
influence the growth of the other side [20]. Hence, customer’s demand on the platform would drive more
sellers to participate in the platform’s competition [12],
which may further influence focal company’s strategy
effectiveness. Although the effect of channel integration
strategy has been demonstrated by a lot of scholars, it is
still unclear about how it works in varied levels of platform’s market demand. Therefore, this study tends to
examine the moderating effect of platform’s market demand on the relationship between promotion integration
strategy and sales performance.

3.

Hypotheses

3.1. The relationship between promotion timing
integration and sales performance
Promotion timing integration refers to company’s
practice to implement promotion activity on varied platforms simultaneously. Existing studies suggested that
integrated marketing communication can enhance
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customer’s positive attitude toward the retailer [17]. In
the context of online platform, company needs to implement a lot of promotion and advertising activity to attract customers and get higher Internet traffic. If company provides promotion activity in different platforms
simultaneously, it would increase the company’s exposure toward customers. Such repeated exposure can increase customer’s awareness about the company and its
offerings [1, 11], which can further increase customer’s
likelihood to purchase in the focal company. Therefore,
we hypotheses that:

competitiveness from company’s promotion depth integration practice, in the condition of high market demand,
alternatives’ attractiveness would further magnify the
negative effect of promotion depth integration. Hence,
we suggest that:
H3a. Platform’s market demand would negatively
moderate the relationship between focal company’s
promotion timing integration and sales performance.
H3b. Platform’s market demand would positively
moderate the relationship between focal company’s
promotion depth integration and sales performance.

H1. Promotion timing integration is positively related with sales performance.

3.2. The relationship between promotion depth
integration and sales performance
Promotion depth integration refers to company’s
practice to maintain consistent promotion depth on varied platforms. Although researchers suggested that inconsistent price information might increase customer’s
uncertainty and confusion toward the product and seller
[15], in the context of multiple platforms, promotion
depth integration might negatively relate with sales performance. Because different platforms have their unique
characteristic, which is reflected by platform’s operation style, consumers’ preference and rivals’ competitive strategy. Although price reduction is a useful way
for company to attract customers and compete with rivals [22], if company remains consistent level of price
reduction, it may limit the company’s attractiveness and
competitiveness on the multiple platforms [3]. Therefore, we hypotheses that:
H2. Promotion depth integration is negatively related with sales performance.

3.3. The moderating effect of platform’s market
demand on promotion integration strategy and
sales performance
According to the cross-side network effect, the
higher platform’s market demand would drive more
competitors to enter platform’s competition [12], which
can further increase product and service choices for customers. Although doing promotion activity simultaneously on varied platforms can increase customer’s brand
awareness, it may have limited effect on enhancing
company’s attractiveness to customers. In the condition
of high platform market demand, the increased number
of competitors and alternative offerings might decrease
focal company’s attractiveness, which thus lead to lower
sales performance. Moreover, due to the limited

4. Methods and results
4.1. Data description
We have transaction data from a Chinese company
during the period from January 2017 to December 2017.
This company was founded in 2000, who mainly sells
the melon seeds through both online and offline channels. In the online channel, the company sells product
mainly through two online platforms (TMALL.COM
and JD.COM). These two platforms differ in terms of
operation pattern, competition and consumer preference.
TMALL.COM operates like “shopping mall”, where exists large number of sellers who can individually manage their own stores and sell the products by using platform’s function. While JD.COM combines the operation way of “supermarket” and “shopping mall”. For the
“supermarket” way, JD.COM purchases products firstly
and then sells and deliveries products to consumers. On
this platform, “supermarket” is the dominant way and
the platform has multiple own warehouses in order to
provide quick delivery services to customers. Hence,
TMALL.COM exists more competitors and alternative
products than JD.COM. Moreover, consumers always
purchase for the low-price products in TMALL.COM,
such as clothes, foods and cosmetics, but prefer to purchase for high-price products in JD.COM, such as electronic equipment and household appliance.
This company has their own stores in these two platforms and the sales from their own stores covers most
of their entire online sales. In order to improve the sales
performance, company always do a lot of promotion activities. For managing the promotion activity, marketing
manager who takes charge of the one platform should
plan the promotion activity in advance and get approval
from the general manager. Their most common promotion way is price discount. By using platform’s price discount function, the discounted products’ website page
would display the discount information.
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Table 1. Description statistics about business
on two platforms
Variable

TMALL.COM

JD.COM

Total order number

17336

19564

Average order price

23.21
(s.e.: 11.28)

30.85
(s.e.: 6.40)

Average number of
SKUs on promotion
per week

3.83
(s.e.: 3.15)

14.33
(s.e.: 8.84)

Average percentage
of price discount per
week

17.04%
(s.e.: 0.1270)

17.84%
(s.e.: 0.1089)

The source data consist of 36900 records from two
main platforms of the company. And Table 1 shows the
basic information about company’s business on these

two platforms. Each record corresponds to one purchase
order and fulfillment, which contains the transaction
time, SKU name, the order volume of the SKU, the original price and transaction price for the SKU and other
consumer demographic information. Given the diversity
of its products, our analysis includes 10 SKUs which belongs to one product category (melon seeds) but with
varied sizes and tastes. Because our data is based on
transaction records, we aggregate the transactions at the
SKU level in each week. Due to the existence of some
time periods without any transactions on two platforms,
the final aggregated data includes 301 observations.
Moreover, for the variable of platform market demand,
we have the platform’s transaction quantity index about
melon seeds in TMALL.COM. We also have the mainly
10 competitor’s transaction volume data in each day in
TMALL.COM and JD.COM, which are used as control
variables in our study. The measurements of all the variables are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Measurements of all variables
Notation

Variable

Definition

Measurements

𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡

Product sales
quantity

Logarithm of SKU m’s sales quantity
in two platforms in week t

LN(𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚,𝑗,𝑡 )

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡

Promotion
depth
integration

The similarity of SKU’s discount rate
in two platforms in week t, the discount rate is calculated as the difference between original price of SKU
minus transaction price of SKU, divided by the original price of SKU

|𝑑𝑖𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑑𝑖𝑠_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑚,𝑗,𝑡 |*(-1)

𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_𝑡𝑖𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡

Promotion
timing
integration

The percentage of days that two platforms have promotion simultaneously
in week t, divided by the total number
of promotion days in two platforms

𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖/𝑗,𝑡

Competitor’s
sales quantity

Competitor’s sales quantity in platform
i/j in week t

𝑝𝑟𝑒_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚

Previous
week’ s sales
quantity

SKU m’s previous week’ sales quantity in two platforms

𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡

Festival

Whether the week t has a traditional or
business festival day

If week t has a traditional or business
festival day, 𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡 =1, else =0

𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡

Month

Each month is defined as the dummy
variable

11 dummy variables for each month

𝑛=10

∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑖,𝑡
𝑛=1
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4.2 Model specification
We developed a fixed-effect model at the SKU-week
level to analyze the longitudinal dataset because the result of the Hausman test that we ran suggested that estimates of the fixed-effect model are consistent, while the
estimates of random-effect model are not. Hence, we
specified the following two fixed-effect models:
𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =∙ 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
∙ +𝛽2 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑡𝑖𝑚_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
∙ +𝛽3 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
∙ +𝛽4 𝑝𝑟𝑒_ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚
∙ +𝛽6 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∙ +𝛽7 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡
∙ +𝛽8 𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡
∙ +𝛽9 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡
∙ +𝜀𝑚,𝑡 (1)

𝐿𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚,𝑡 =∙ 𝛼𝑚 + 𝛽1 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
∙ +𝛽2 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑡𝑖𝑚_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
∙ +𝛽3 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
∙ +𝛽4 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
× 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
∙ +𝛽5 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚_ 𝑡𝑖𝑚_ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑚,𝑡
× 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_ 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡
∙ +𝛽6 𝑝𝑟𝑒_ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑚
∙ +𝛽7 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
∙ +𝛽8 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡
∙ +𝛽9 𝑓𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑡
∙ +𝛽10 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑦𝑡
∙ +𝜀𝑚,𝑡 (2)
The only difference between the model 1 and model
2 is that model 2 adds an interaction term between two
dimension of promotion integration strategy and platform’s market demand, which tests the moderating effect proposed in our hypotheses.

4.3. Heteroscedasticity, serial correlation,
multicollinearity
To check for serial correlation, we used Wooldridge
test to examine whether there is first order serial correlation. The results indicated the presence of first-order
autocorrelation in our panel dataset (F(1,3) = 66.473, p
< 0.000). To check for heteroscedasticity, we performed
the Wald test to examine whether the errors are homoscedastic. The result indicates the presence of heteroscedasticity ((χ² = 242.88, p < 0.000). These two issues

suggest for using the fixed-effect model with robust
standard errors [24]. We also checked for multicollinearity, the highest variance inflation factor is 3.25, which
is below the threshold of 10. Moreover, the correlation
analysis showed in Table 3 represents that the correlation between variables is satisfied. Hence, these results
indicate that multicollinearity is not a major concern in
our study.

Table 3 Correlation analysis
Variable

Mean

S. D

1

Product sales quantity
Promotion depth
integration
Promotion timing
integration
Platform’s market demand

147.76

419.37

1

-0.16

0.15

-0.48

1

0.14

0.27

0.51

-0.11

1

49134.94

10834.47

0.16

-0.22

0.09

1

146.74

419.65

0.70

-0.38

0.44

0.16

1

103577.6

299286.5

0.16

-0.12

0.13

0.07

0.21

1

25383.6

46564.99

0.00

0.03

-0.02

0.07

0.02

0.13

1

--

--

0.05

-0.04

0.02

0.04

0.04

0.13

-0.25

Previous sales
Competitor’s sales quantity
in TMALL.COM
Competitor’s sales quantity
in JD.COM
Festival

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
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4.4. Results
Table 4 presents the fixed-effect regression results
for all variables with robust standard errors and the dependent variable is the SKU’s sales quantity on two platforms. The results show that promotion timing integration is positively related with sales quantity on two platforms (β=0.65, p<0.000). Thus, H1 was supported. Promotion depth integration is negatively related with sales
quantity on two platforms (β=-0.72, p<0.000), which
supports H2. Furthermore, the platform’s market demand negatively moderates the relationship between
promotion timing integration and SKU’s sales quantity
on two platforms (β=-1.93, p<0.01), which support for
H3a. But the moderating effect of platform’s market demand does not significantly influence the relationship

between promotion depth integration and SKU’s sales
quantity on two platforms (β=0.28, p=0.36). Therefore,
H3b was not supported.

4.5. Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of our estimation,
several alternative measurements are compared. First,
we use the sales amount as the alternative way to measure sales performance and obtained the same substantive findings. Second, we use the absolute price discounts to represent for promotion depth, which provide
inferior results. Moreover, we aggregate the transaction
data at each SKU’s month level, which gives similar results.

Table 4 Results of fixed-effect model with robust standard errors
Dependent variable:
Product sales quantity
Promotion timing
integration
Promotion depth
integration
Platform market demand
Promotion depth integration *
Platform market demand
Promotion timing integration
* Platform market demand
Previous week’s sales
quantity
Competitor’s sales volume in
TAMLL.COM
Competitor’s sales volume in
JD.COM

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.65*** (6.46)

0.65***(6.50)

21.20 ** (4.01)

21.60** (4.16)

-0.72*** (-8.95)

-0.95 (-0.24)

-0.75*** (-10.64)

-3.78 (-1.22)

0.83 (1.07)

0.84 (1.27)

0.40 (0.52)

0.53 (0.82)

0.02 (0.06)

0.28 (0.96)
-1.89 **(-3.89)

-1.93** (-4.04)

0.20*** (5.93)

0.20*** (6.55)

0.17 **(4.49)

0.17*** (4.86)

-0.05 (-1.09)

-0.05 (-1.04)

-0.06 (-1.38)

-0.06 (-1.3)

0.28 (1.44)

0.28 (1.45)

0.31 (1.71)

0.31 (1.71)

Festival

0.26 (1.46)

0.26 (1.55)

0.36 (1.68)

0.37 (1.76)

_cons

-8.85 (-0.94)

-8.97 (-1.11)

-4.29 (-0.47)

-5.74 (-0.72)

SKU fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Time fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

R-square

45.73%

45.73%

49.62%

49.70%

Notes: *sig at 0.05, **sig at 0.01, ***sig at 0.001.

5. Discussion
The current research has studied the impact of promotion integration strategy on sales performance and
considered the moderating effect of platform’s market
demand in the context of multiple platforms. The results
show that promotion timing integration is positively related with sales performance, which is consistent with
most studies’ viewpoint that channel integration strategy can lead to positive firm level outcome [5, 16].

However, deviating from most studies in multichannel
retailing, promotion depth integration is negatively related with sales performance, which indicates the negative side of integration strategy. The above findings
complement the knowledge gap about the promotion
strategy on multiple platforms [14].
Moreover, our study also uncovered the role of platform’s market demand. We demonstrated that high platform’s market demand would negatively influence the
effect of promotion timing integration. This result supplements our understanding about platform’s influence
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on the effectiveness of integration strategy [21]. But our
study does not show the significant influence of platform’s market demand on the effect of promotion depth
integration. A possible explanation could be that when
in the condition of high product demand, customers may
engage in impulsive purchase and may not care about
the nuanced differences in price and promotion in two
platforms.
The findings of the current study also offer guidelines for managers to implement promotion activity on
different platforms. Specifically, we suggest that
providing promotion activity simultaneously on different platforms can lead to the synergy effect, which
means that when company offers promotion simultaneously, the whole sales performance is greater than the
simple sum of two platforms. But companies are supposed to decide the promotion depth according to consumer and platform’s characteristics. Moreover, in the
condition of high platform’s market demand, the effect
of promotion integration strategy is limited, thus companies should complement it with other marketing strategy.
We believe that our findings provide unique theoretical and practical insights about the effect of promotion
integration strategy and platform’s market demand.
However, it still has some limitations that should be
considered by future studies. First, the current study
only provides the correlational results about the relationship between promotion integration strategy and
sales performance. Future study can use field experiment to test for the causal effect of promotion integration strategy on sales. Second, due to the data limitation,
we only focused on one company who sells nuts in
China. Hence, the results of this study may not be appropriately generalized to other companies and industries. Future study can expand the sample size. Third,
this study only considered the level of promotion depth
and timing, future study can add in comparison of promotion type and company’s deal support.
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